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‘Squeezing, ... ‘bleaching’ and ‘the victims’ fate’: 
wounds, geography, poetry, micrology 
 
Chris Philo 
University of Glasgow 
 
This paper opens a dialogue between geohumanities and poetry – or, more broadly, creative 
writing – around the subject-matters of violence and wounding. It considers what kinds of 
‘poetry’ might be usefully enrolled by the geoliterary critic, or even authored by the geographer-
poet, in response to such subject-matters. Difficult questions abound about what it means to 
author, hear and read poetry that is engaged and enraged by instances of violence, trauma and 
victimhood. One horizon for these questions is Adorno’s claim that ‘there can be no more poetry 
after Auschwitz’, and more particularly his elaboration and partial retreat from this claim in 
Negative Dialectics (1973). Here, wary of attempts ‘at squeezing any kind of sense, however 
bleached, out of the victims’ fate’ (Adorno 1973, 361), he nonetheless concludes that ‘perennial 
suffering has as much right to expression as a tortured man to scream; hence it may be wrong to 
say that after Auschwitz you can no longer write poems’ (363). This paper explores Adorno’s 
position, chiefly pursuing his arguments about the need for poetry – and indeed philosophy – that 
strives not for ‘purity’ but precisely to be ‘soiled’ and ‘spoiled’, never comforting, always 
disconcerting, never idealistically ‘transcendent’, always materialistically ‘micrological’. 
Including reference to a short story by Borges and critique of poetry by the geographer Wreford 
Watson, the argument is further advanced by attending to Adorno’s claims about another poet, 
Heine, sometimes regarded as a particularly ‘geographical’ poet. The paper concludes with final 
notes on possible implications for recasting work on wounded geographies as a species of 
‘applied micrology’. Key words: poetry; micrology; Adorno; Holocaust; Borges; Heine 
 
 
EVERY SMALLEST THING 
 
He was about fifty years old. Poor in the goods of this world, persecuted, denied, 
vituperated, he had dedicated his genius to the praise of Happiness. I recall that Albert 
Soergel, in his work Dichtung der Zeit, compared him with Whitman. The comparison 
is not exact. Whitman celebrates the universe in a preliminary, abstract almost 
indifferent manner; Jerusalem takes joy in each thing, with a scrupulous and exact 
love. He never falls into the error of enumerations and catalogues. … 
 
I was severe with him; I permitted neither my compassion nor his glory to make me 
relent. I had come to understand many years that there is nothing on earth that does 
not contain the seed of a possible hell; a face, a word, a compass, a cigarette 
advertisement are capable of driving a person mad if he is unable to forget them. … I 
decided to apply this principle to the disciplinary regimen of our camp … 
 
I do not know whether Jerusalem understood that, if I destroyed him, it was to destroy 
my compassion. (Borges 2000, 176 & 177.)1 
 
These passages derive from a short story by Jorge Luis Borges (1899-1986) entitled 
‘Deutsches Requiem’, one of the few Latin American contributions to what might be 
termed ‘Holocaust literature’ (Roskies & Diamant 2012).  The story is the fictional last 
testament of Otto Dietrich zur Linde, subdirector of the Tarnowitz concentration camp, 
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awaiting execution for his war crimes.  Linde feels no fear, expresses no remorse, merely 
rehearses a justification for the Nazi assault on Judaism, and glorifies the violence – ‘we 
revelled in the great days and nights of a successful war’ (Borges 2000, 177) – as 
necessary world-transforming work that must never to be distilled by compassion.  
Making concrete this ideology, Linde reflects on ‘the eminent poet David Jerusalem from 
Breslau’ (176), a poet of ‘every smallest thing’,2 the meticulous and even loving chronicler 
of precisely that detail over which Linde would insist riding roughshod.  For Linde, such 
attention to the detail is ‘soft’, a threat to the greater project, not least in the depths of ‘the 
camp’3: it is not uncommon ‘in a wretched cell, where insidious deceitful mercy tempts 
us with ancient tenderness’ (176).  The implication is that much of Linde’s operation at 
Tarnowitz was designed precisely to bulldoze such detail, the ‘[m]any things [that] will 
have to be destroyed in order to construct the New Order’ (179), and his particularly 
severe treatment of Jerusalem evidently encapsulated a wish to expunge all residual 
compassion from his own soul.4 
This opening perfectly captures the drift and purpose of my arguments to follow, as 
well as having echoes in the theoretical track that I will take with the assistance of the 
German philosopher-aesthetic critic Theodor Adorno, for whom the violent indifference 
of the Nazi death camp is pivotal.  His invocation never to ‘write poetry’ again ‘after 
Auschwitz’, one that he subsequently qualifies in various ways that might be termed 
(deploying his own naming) ‘micrology’, is the chief thread tying together my attempt 
below at contriving materials for a critical geohumanities.  Indeed, my simple claim is that 
Adorno’s micrology is profoundly geographical, demanding the most careful lingering 
with the micro-spatial assemblage of details – of bodies and things, peoples and places – 
in order to capture those intimate horrors, for instance of the Holocaust, so easily (and 
understandably) over-looked in the haste to see bolder sweeps, clearer lessons, lasting 
salvations.  I join hands here with the remarkable efforts of Kearns (2014), in his 
borrowings from Primo Levi, perhaps the pre-eminent Holocaust writer and one for 
whom, indeed, the details have always mattered.  Moving seamlessly from the micrology 
of a hay-shed, a small material survival of Auschwitz III, into reconstructing the overall 
machinery (and words) of the Holocaust, Kearns provides the dual biopolitial and 
geopolitical framing for my own, more partial reflections on a geopoetry5 of violence and 
wounds.  Commencing with a critical reading of poetry by the geographer, James Wreford 
Watson, which he self-consciously positioned against the Holocaust, I then follow 
Adorno’s convolutions around poetry and Holocaust, addressing his micrological 
resolution and how that might be mapped on to the poetry of Heinrich Heine, the focus of 
one short essay by Adorno.  In conclusion, I summarise these manoeuvres, as well as 
returning briefly to Levi and his geographical interlocutors, to wonder about what might 
be cast as a species of ‘applied micrology’ in the poetic-geographical realm. 
‘THE WOUNDS OF LOVE’: 
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TRANSCENDING HOLOCAUSTS? 
 
‘James Wreford Watson [1915-1990] was a geographer and a poet’, states Guy M. 
Robinson (1997, 106), elaborating that ‘Watson can be accurately described as a 
geographer-poet’ (108).6  A pioneer of regional geography attuned to literary sources and 
style (Johnston 1993, 326-327; Robinson 1997, 110-111), as well as innovating with 
ideas about how social geography should take seriously ‘social distance’ (Philo 1991; 
Robinson 1997, 109-110; Withers 2008, 109), Wreford Watson held the Chair of 
Geography at the University of Edinburgh from 1953 to 1983.  He authored four books of 
poetry under the semi-pseudonym James Watson,7 one of which, The Wounds of Love 
(1985), initially attracted my notice for a previous paper (Philo 2005) when recovering 
what geographers have previously authored about violence and, more specifically, the 
phenomena of wounds, wounding and being wounded.  Elsewhere in this paper I had 
taken ‘literary-critical’ and ‘anthropological detours’, gleaning from diverse authors (eg. 
Das 1995; Ledbetter 1996; Winnberg 2003) the value of the researcher-writer accessing 
‘secret histories’ inscribed on the ‘bodies and souls’ of the wounded.  At stake was a 
narrowing of the gulf between researcher-writer – perhaps even the wounders too – and 
the wounded, purposefully creating a space for precisely that conjoint ‘one-body 
compassion’ (Leder 1990) so strenuously crushed by Linde in the Borges short story. 
Although unexamined in my 2005 paper, Wreford Watson’s poetry in The Wounds 
of Love arguably remains distant from such compassion, and it is hence an instructive 
counter-point for the trajectory of reasoning in my current piece.  The Wounds of Love 
was clearly intended as a work of Christian poetry, with the Cross and (tellingly) Crown 
of Thorns, primary Christian symbols, prominent on the cover (Figure 1).  His parents 
being Scottish Presbyterian missionaries, ‘Watson’s background … was reflected in his 
strong religious convictions and perhaps also in his lecturing style, which had more than 
a little of the preacher about it’ (Robinson 1997, 107).  ‘Wreford believed that students 
should be well educated by the Professor before they graduated for jobs in the outside 
world’ (in Howell et al 2008: 131; original emphasis), with students having to ‘Rise for 
the Professor’ when he entered and on no account being permitted to leave until he had 
finished what might be construed as his ‘sermon’.  ‘As a Presbyterian,’ he would ‘have had 
a childhood of hellfire and brimstone, redemption (or possibilities thereof) [and] 
mortification of the flesh,’ remarks Charles Withers (2016, pers.comm.); and such a 
snapshot does fit well with the evidence of the poems in The Wounds of Love.  There may 
be a theological reading of these poems that stresses Christ’s shedding of blood on the 
cross as an act of love for all humans, a supreme act of ‘compassion’ wherein He shares 
their bodily suffering.8  Nonetheless, another reading might conclude that there is little 
here to suggest the variety of ‘one-body-compassion’ proposed by Leder (1990); and that 
Wreford Watson’s poetry reveals less a compassionate attitude to wounding and 
attending to wounds, in an everyday scene, more a bloodthirsty appetite for wounding as 
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pivotal to the ideological project of a zealous, ‘puritanical’ Christianity (one unforgiving 
of vulnerability, weakness, being wounded).  Even if leaning towards the first 
interpretation, however, there remains something instructive for what follows in how 
Wreford Watson introduces and then executes his poetry, as I will now reflect. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Cover of The Wounds of Love ([Wreford] Watson 1985) 
 
Wreford Watson’s preface to his pamphlet of poetry describes how his career as a 
professional geographer affords insight into the ‘terrestrial unity of things’, but also to 
how this insight became challenged by a world in which ‘the wolf and the lamb co-exist’, 
where ‘disorder and pain’ prevails (Wreford Watson 1985, 7).  As he continues, with a 
reference of special note for what follows later: 
 
Man’s [sic.] power of betterment may have climbed to a height but his guilt in 
debasement has fallen to an all-time low. Rarely has man seen anything so cruel as 
the holocausts of twentieth century persecution and war. Here was a profoundly 
disturbing thing that crooked the intelligibility of the world. (7) 
 
For him, though, the answer, the assurance of ‘intelligibility’, ultimately derives from 
divine sources, and more especially from ‘the wounds of love’ found in the figure of 
‘Christ, wounded for me’: ‘The efficacy of His august anguish is a profound mystery, but 
one that somehow reconciles the particularity of suffering with the universality of order’ 
(7).  It is not remotely to suggest that Wreford Watson excuses the wounds inflicted by 
the likes of the Holocaust, but such wounds are set within what is taken as a greater 
pattern, a transcendent intelligibility, whose interpretation teeters on the brink of 
positioning such abuses and pain primarily as earthly grist to a heavenly mill.  As I will 
show below, such a move to situate the Holocaust in a larger, transcendent pattern is 
readily open to sustained critique; and, while caution is needed with such a remark, the 
distance between such a response to the Holocaust and the fictitious stance of Linde – 
5 
 
always with an eye on the transcendent, the world-shifting, some grander play of power, 
resistance and resolution – is maybe not that great. 
Returning to Wreford Watson’s pamphlet, what assaults me is indeed the sheer 
bloodlust in many of the poems from The Wounds of Love.  Poem after poem overflow 
with savage wounds, weeping sores, blood running free.  ‘Christ’s bloody sweat’ 
nourishes the world: ‘it took wounds to wet the withered earth,’ a ‘bleeding [that] would 
drench the world, the world would green itself again’ (from Gethsemane, 15).  In this 
guise, Christ’s wounds, but also maybe wounds more generally, are required, an essential 
part of the Bible story, of pain and redemption; and the author, picturing himself as Jesus 
whipped towards the Cross, invites that pain, welcoming those wounds, as a penitent 
desiring to be lashed: ‘Lay the whip on me: O do your worst – [with] this wounding …’ 
(from The Flogging, 28).  Moreover, ‘these wounds shall – O world, become all wonder yet 
– become the all beautiful’ (from The Crucifixion, 33).  ‘The greatest conflagration in the 
world – the revolution of the wound’ is how Wreford Watson captures Jesus on the Cross, 
at which sight ‘let men catch their breath – at wounds so awesome they make – their 
wounds a mere mote’ (from The Crucifixion, 34).  The later poems in the pamphlet rage in 
a similar vein, but with the focus increasingly shifting towards how Jesus’s wounds 
refresh all humanity, wash away the secular wounds and pains of everyday societies; so 
that, as part of a divine plan, the people of the earth ‘may come out – of the dark wood of 
our feral blood’ and ‘may from the wounds of love – [make] a richer, freer, truer world’ 
(from The Final Things, 71).  The direction of travel is clearly that announced in Wreford 
Watson’s preface, in that wounds of all kinds – those of the crucified Jesus, but so too 
those inflicted by humans on their fellow humans, including mental or spiritual pain – are 
to be understood as serving a purpose, featuring in an epic narrative of ‘fall’, ‘overcoming’ 
and ‘redemption’.9  Such an attempt to convert wounding of all stripes and magnitudes 
into the passages of a biblical morality play comprises one instance, admittedly minor but 
still instructive, of why Adorno proposed his prohibition on poetry ‘after Auschwitz’, a 
prohibition to which I will now turn. 
 
‘THERE CAN BE NO MORE POETRY AFTER AUSCHWITZ’: 
ADORNO AND WOUNDED POETRY 
 
Theodor Adorno (1903-1969) is a major if now somewhat ‘unfashionable’, even 
neglected figure of cultural criticism, philosophy and letters from the last century.10  A 
member of the so-called Frankfurt School of critical theory who, as a German of Jewish 
descent with leftist-Marxian sympathies, was forced into exile during the Nazi era, 
eventually ending up in California after a spell in Oxford, before eventually returning to 
Germany with a mission to prevent backsliding towards the ideological conditions that 
had permitted the Nazi debacle in the first place.  His oeuvre only makes sense within this 
context: it is thoroughly marked by the Nazi-inflicted horrors of the mid-twentieth 
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century, which pressed upon him so personally (and very directly led to the death of his 
one-time mentor, Benjamin, in which connection Adorno refers to ‘Hitler’s executioners’: 
Adorno 1967c, 229).  With Horkheimer, Adorno authored Dialectic of Enlightenment 
([1944, 1947] 1972), an impassioned cry against the tendency within European 
Enlightenment to decay into ‘myth’, darkness, viciousness and violence.  Initially 
published in 1944, this key text of twentieth-century Western thought was unmistakably 
railing against the Nazi perversions of Enlightenment and modernity, with questions 
about anti-Semitism and fascism – and, tellingly, the latter’s manipulations of cultural 
media and aesthetics – heavily to the fore.  In consequence, and understandably perhaps, 
Adorno’s sprawling written corpus is profoundly negative, captured by the title of his last 
master-work Negative Dialectics ([1966] 1973), with the impulse always being to 
critique, to critique the critique, to root out and subject to forensic critical analysis any 
manoeuvre – intellectual, aesthetic or otherwise creative – that seeks to be affirmative, to 
offer optimism, to speak of wholesomeness, recuperation and reconciliation (in another 
vocabulary, ‘to heal the wounds’).  Nigel Thrift (2000, 269) once remarked that ‘[i]n 
Foucault country, it always seems to be raining’; and, if that be the case, in Adorno country 
it is always torrential, stormy, overhung with the blackest of thunder clouds. 
Proceeding in this dismal vein, Adorno did indeed once propose that ‘There can be 
no more poetry after Auschwitz’, although in fact he never quite said exactly this, as I will 
explain.  It is an injunction that, if taken at face value and extended to other forms of 
creative, even scholarly writing, does appear to foreclose on any possibility of a ‘one-body 
compassion’ in writing about and for wounded worlds.  Nonetheless, this is not quite the 
full story.  Rather, my argument will be that, by chasing a little more closely what Adorno 
actually said, notably as he subsequently revisited and recast his Auschwitz claim, a 
somewhat different conclusion can be reached: one that does, after all, suggest that there 
is a meaningful, maybe even urgent, task to be addressed around a poetics of 
memorialising pain, suffering and wounding.  Moreover, I will venture that a few clues 
are sprinkled into Adorno’s deliberations about how such a task could be approached, 
and how a geographical sensibility might – necessarily, not just incidentally – be folded 
into the pursuit of that task.  In pursuing these leads, I elaborate on a tantalisingly brief 
claim by Magrane (2015, 97 and Note 9, 98), himself exploring geopoetics, that Adorno’s 
‘after Auschwitz’ statement should be read less ‘as a critique of poetry per se’, but more 
as a nuanced call for alternative, critical poetries which remain resolutely ‘grounded’ or 
even ‘earthed’. 
Adorno initially made his Auschwitz poetry claim in a 1949 essay, translated into 
English as the first chapter in his book Prisms (Adorno 1967).  The essay, titled in English 
‘Cultural criticism and society’, was a fierce broadside against the Nazi treatment of both 
culture (broadly conceived) and what might, for the Nazis, pass as ‘cultural critique’ 
(watered down here into the likes of ‘art appreciation’).  It was also evidently a diatribe 
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against the emerging ‘culture industry’ in the US, which Adorno feared to be another 
potential vehicle for authoritarian brain-washing, as well as against all ‘weak’ forms of 
cultural critique – wherever arising – which either stayed too close to their objects 
(‘immanent’ critique remaining locked in the empirics of a cultural product) or claimed 
to see so much further beyond them (‘transcendent’ critique veering into sweeping, 
possibly sentimentalist, denunciations or re-positionings).  All such cultural trajectories, 
in both the making and the critique, struck him – only a handful of years out from WWII 
– as repugnant, freighted with dangers of allowing what had just occurred to recur.  Hence 
he wrote, as the final sentences in this essay: 
 
Cultural criticism finds itself faced with the final stage of the dialectic of culture and 
barbarism. To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric. And this corrodes even the 
knowledge of why it has become impossible to write poetry today. Absolute 
reification, which presupposed intellectual progress as one of its elements, is now 
preparing to absorb the mind entirely. Critical intelligence cannot be equal to this 
challenge as long as it confines itself to self-satisfied contemplation. (Adorno 1967b, 
34) 
 
The reference to ‘absolute reification’ reflects a Kantian-Hegelian debate about the 
conversion of the world into abstract ‘objects’ or ‘categories’ that can be named and 
analysed, a moment of ‘intellectual progress’, but then alludes to the dangers of such de-
contextualised – we might add, de-sensitised – objectification becoming the lode-stone of 
‘the mind’ (of intellectual and creative life).  Adorno’s tricky philosophical-critical 
position throughout his career was urging the need to stay with the substantive contents 
of the object – Auschwitz as Auschwitz, maybe – rather than abstracting away from them, 
thereby letting matters descend into ‘self-satisfied contemplation,’ while also subjecting 
the worldly contexts of the objects to sustained critique (in part the residue of his Marxian 
historical materialism). 
There are many issues coded into this passage, then, but a basic (and powerful) 
reading is one that simply says something like: 
 
To persist, after Auschwitz, in the production of monuments of the very culture that 
produced Auschwitz … is to participate in the perpetuation of that barbaric culture 
and to participate in the process (reification) that renders fundamental criticism of 
that culture literally unthinkable. (Oard 2011, n.p.) 
 
The Auschwitz allusion chillingly conveys the barbarism endemic to the Nazi regime’s 
treatment of culture, society and those peoples apparently not fitting properly into an 
envisaged perfection of culture and society.  ‘Poetry’ appears to stand in for the final 
construct of ‘self-satisfied contemplation,’ meanwhile, and, in its coupling with 
Auschwitz, the warning is unleashed that such an uncritical poetic practice, or uncritical 
literary or intellectual practice, is closely compounded with fascism and its gruesome 
machinations.  There is probably a narrower target as well, reflecting Adorno’s ongoing 
battle against a Heidegerrian poetics – of ‘shelteredness’, dwelling, rusticity, agrarianism, 
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provinciality – which he took as celebrating a ‘jargon of authenticity’ complicit with the 
Nazi project (Adorno 2003, esp.20, 40-48), what Heidegger himself called ‘the utopia of a 
half-poetic intellect’ (on 43).  There are sizeable issues here with a substantial 
geographical inflection, not least in the poetic spatialising of authenticity – of what is 
supposedly inherent in dwelling authentically – as indicated by the nouns listed above, 
but such issues require a sustained treatment impossible in the present paper (but see 
Harrison 2007a). 
Adorno returned to his Auschwitz poetry claim in a radio talk of 1962, a written 
version of which appeared soon after before being translated into English with the title 
‘Commitment’ (Adorno 1992b).  Beginning with the statement ‘I do not want to soften my 
statement that it is barbaric to continue to write poetry after Auschwitz,’ here he 
continues by adding that ‘it expresses, negatively, the impulse that animates committed 
literature’ (87).  ‘Committed literature’, for Adorno, is writing that ‘works towards an 
attitude,’ opposed to ‘a spectator-like neutrality’ (79): it is writing that is critical, that 
never evades the question of whether ‘culture’ (as in poetry, literature, art) ‘as such 
should exist at all’ (87) in a society which has ‘regressed’ into ‘breaking the bones’ of its 
weakest members.  The reasons for such a question are laid out with chilling honesty, as 
Adorno ponders what is at stake in creating ‘art’ (or ‘poetry’) out of suffering, even if the 
creators have themselves been victims: 
 
The victims are turned into works of art, tossed out to be gobbled up by the world 
that did them in. The so-called artistic rendering of the naked physical pain of those 
who were beaten down with rifle butts contains, however distantly, the possibility 
that pleasure can be squeezed from it. The morality that forbids art to forget this for 
a second slides off into abyss of its opposite. The aesthetic stylistic principle, and even 
the chorus’ solemn prayer, make the unthinkable appear to have had some meaning; 
it becomes transfigured, something of its horror removed. (88) 
 
The possibility that some pleasure (aesthetic, ethical, intellectual) may be derived from 
the art or poetry of victimhood, from the aesthetic rendering of the wounds, is rigorously 
exposed.  Yet Adorno pushes deeper still, in his characteristically negative-dialectical 
fashion, to expose the unavoidable ‘parasitism’ – my word, not his – attending any 
moments of positive (healing, therapeutic) meaning drawn from the record of prior 
suffering or wounding.  Thus, pushed to the extreme, every lesson arguably learned, every 
intimation of goodness in the badness from which ‘we’ might garner strength, every 
‘cloud’s silver lining’, is parasitic upon, even arguably complicit with, what has gone 
before.  In some of the most uncompromising critical text ever penned, Adorno continues: 
 
When even genocide becomes cultural property in committed literature, it becomes 
easier to continue complying with the culture that gave rise to the murder. One 
characteristic of such literature is virtually ever-present: it shows us humanity 
blossoming in so-called extreme situations, and in fact precisely there, and at times 
this becomes a dreary metaphysics that affirms the horror, which has been justified 
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as a ‘boundary situation’, by virtue of the notion that authenticity of human being is 
manifested there. (88-89) 
 
This passage, which adds the disconcerting image of a ‘cozy existential atmosphere 
[where] the distinction between victim and executioner becomes blurred’ (89), exactly 
as Linde feared, is truly world-upside-down-turning.  It surgically strikes at what so often 
is the justification for engaging with the words and experiences of victims: namely, that 
even here ‘we’ can detect shards of ‘humanity’, of courage, dignity, recalcitrance or even 
maybe the momentary kindness of the gaoler-executioner, which somehow redeems the 
situation.  ‘We’ engage with the pain, the suffering, the wounding; and, magically, ‘we’ 
start to feel better, a salve is laid over us, a redemption sought.  In a way, it is this structure 
of meaning that circulates in Wreford Watson’s poetry: the more wounding, the more 
battering by whip and world, the more ‘we’ can access the ‘love of God’, the ultimate salve 
or redemption.  Seen through such lenses, it becomes crystal-clear what Adorno means 
by the ‘barbarism’ of continuing to write poetry after Auschwitz. 
This is not the end of the matter, however, since Adorno is still alert to other lines 
of reasoning, even as he then bites back at them (his negative-dialectical drive would 
expect nothing less).  Hence, even before the above two quoted passages, he avows that 
‘literature’ (art, poetry) must ‘not surrender to cynicism [including his own?] merely by 
existing after Auschwitz’ (88), not least because, in spite of all the perils, there does 
remain an unavoidable, vital, critical function to perform which is, after all, that of 
remembering: 
 
The abundance of real suffering permits no forgetting; Pascal’s theological ‘On ne doit 
plus dormir’ [‘Sleeping is no longer permitted’] should be secularised. But that 
suffering – what Hegel calls the awareness of the affliction – also demands the 
existence of the very art it forbids; hardly anywhere else does suffering still find its 
own voice, a consolation that does not immediately betray it. (88) 
 
A somewhat different logic is advanced here: a demand for constant vigilance, called forth 
by ensuring a constant presence of the suffering endured by those who went before: an 
active remembering, a living archiving, which does not permit the cultural critic to ‘fall 
asleep’ on the job.  This move is to invoke and deploy poetry ‘after Auschwitz’ – which 
might indeed be the poetry of Auschwitz, authored by its survivors – as part of an ongoing 
critical project, not necessarily a positive one of reconstruction, of making new 
alternatives, but rather a critical-negative one (a stance of ‘never again’).  Intriguingly, 
Adorno finds his exemplars in ‘[t]he most significant artists of the [post-war] period,’ with 
the ‘uncompromising radicalism of their works,’ often ‘denounced as formalism,’ being 
exactly what ‘endows them with a frightening power that impotent poems about the 
victims lack’ (88).  Thus, he invokes the great modernists such as Brecht or Picasso, rather 
than the poetry of or about victims, as the model for such a ‘voicing’ of suffering; and, in 
this guise, we might hesitate (as have others reading Adorno) before a certain cultural 
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elitism that potentially distances itself from the immediacy of the horrors, the grim 
situated geographies of the wounding. 
Adorno returned one more time to the ‘after Auschwitz’ problematic, and now such 
an elite distancing largely disappears: the work in question is his late master-work 
Negative Dialectics, mentioned before, originally published in 1966 as Negative Dialektik 
and then in an English translation of 1973.  Late in this mammoth text, he writes as 
follows, yielding some of the words borrowed for the title of my paper: 
 
After Auschwitz, our feelings resist any claims of the positivity of existence as 
sanctimonious, as wronging the victims; they balk at squeezing any kind of sense, 
however bleached, out of the victims’ fate. And these feelings do have an objective 
side after events that make a mockery of any construction of immanence as endowed 
with a meaning radiated by an affirmatively posited transcendence. (Adorno 1973, 
361) 
 
Echoing his earlier formulation, Auschwitz again stands in for the horror of the Nazi era, 
and Adorno is consistent with his younger self in resisting any attempt to extract positive, 
affirmative meaning from the abuses of this camp or period: he ‘balk[s] at squeezing any 
kind of sense, however bleached, out of the victims’ fate.’  Such a balking runs alongside 
broader, complex philosophical claims being made about not finding – and believing it to 
be abhorrent even to try finding – some radiant transcendence (about, say, human 
dignity, resilience, truth) rising above and beyond the empirical facts immanent to camp 
and period.  In hard words, Adorno casts what happened at Auschwitz as a quantitative 
erasure, a ‘level[ling] off (362), a replacing of ‘the individual’ with ‘the specimen’ that can 
be liquidated at a moment’s notice.  The Marxist in him also prompts an equation with 
the profiteering logics of capitalism, indifferent to the individual, and with ‘the coldness, 
the basic principle of bourgeois subjectivity, without which there could have been no 
Auschwitz’ (363). 
On the subject of whether there could or should be poetry ‘after Auschwitz’, Adorno 
now proceeds further with recalibrating his thinking from the original 1949 polemic.  
‘Perennial suffering has as much right to expression as a tortured man has to scream,’ he 
admits, adding that ‘hence it may have been wrong to say that after Auschwitz you could 
no longer write poems’ (362).  Moreover, ‘[a] new categorical imperative has been 
imposed by Hitler upon unfree [hu]mankind: to arrange their thoughts and actions so 
that Auschwitz will not repeat itself, so that nothing similar will happen’ (365).  Such a 
remark repeats the insistence about ‘sleeping not being permitted’: about avoiding 
Auschwitz, gliding past it, seeking ‘religious consolation’ (367: cf. Wreford Watson’s 
muse, as discussed earlier), or returning to the philosophical poetics obtaining before 
Auschwitz and maybe thereby paving a route for its return (and here Heidegger is once 
again in Adorno’s cross-hairs).  To prevent such dangerous complacency, Adorno offers 
sketchy gestures towards what a wide-awake post-Auschwitz poetry might entail and 
demand.  He calls for attention to ‘[t]he somatic, unmeaningful stratum of life [as] the 
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stage of suffering, of the suffering which, in the camps, without any consolation, burned 
every soothing feature out of the mind, and of culture’ (365).  The poetic response should 
precisely engage such embodied horror, denying meaning and consolation, and 
confronting what might usually be repressed (in a loosely psychoanalytic idiom).  
Provocatively, he takes the image of the child fascinated by the smells issuing from ‘the 
flayer’s zone, from carcasses,’ not to furnish material to serve some higher, philosophical 
concern – perhaps to illuminate some ‘ontologically pure being named Death’ – but, 
rather, ‘for the sake of that which the stench of the cadavers expresses and [which] we 
are fooled about by their transfiguration into remains’ (366).11  In equating camp and 
slaughterhouse, together with his reference to the child as a phenomenological opening 
to such ‘banal decay’,10 Adorno opens a poetic sensibility that pays intense attention to 
the details of the wounding; that crafts a sensory encounter with the intimate, embodied 
spaces of the suffering, describing the wounds in hard-edged detail without gloss, excuse 
or consolation. 
Elsewhere, harkening back to his mentor, Benjamin,12 Adorno speaks, if briefly, of 
‘micrology’, a compulsion to chase, disclose and scrutinise the very small, the minutely 
detailed, the ‘scraps’ of the world in its ‘immediacy’ and ‘fullness’ (here deploying terms 
scattered throughout Adorno 1973).  Fully to unpack Adorno’s thinking about micrology 
would necessitate a sustained brush with other notions central to Adorno’s oeuvre, 
notably ‘non-identity’ (of the object), the ‘non-conceptual’, ‘constellations’, ‘models’, ‘anti-
systems’ and maybe also ‘prisms’ (Adorno 1967), all of which cluster together into what 
might be identified as ‘Adorno’s geography’.  For the purposes at hand, though, it will 
suffice to underline that Adorno sets micrology against thought, where ‘thought’ indexes 
the habitual Enlightenment processes of abstraction, transcendence and the like – 
including the ‘error of enumerations and catalogues’ (Borges 2000, 176) – as contrasted 
with an older, pre-Enlightenment version of ‘metaphysics’ which acquiesced in what it 
could not think, what it did not know, what magic or malevolence might lie beyond but 
still be intimated by the smallest details.  In his own (tricky) words: 
 
Represented in the inmost cell of thought is that which is unlike thought. The smallest 
intra-mundane traits would be of relevance to the absolute, for the micrological view 
cracks the shells of what, measured by the subsuming cover concept, is helplessly 
isolated and [instead] explodes its identity, the delusion that it is but a specimen. 
There is solidarity between such thinking and metaphysics at the time of its fall 
[under Enlightenment] . (Adorno 1973, 361) 
 
The call is for a quite particular discipline of thought – elsewhere Adorno terms it ‘non-
conceptual’ – profoundly responsive to the smallest details, able to split open the ‘shell’ 
of these details, peering beneath how they might otherwise be smeared into abstractions, 
categories and regarded only as ‘specimens’ for a prior grid of intelligibility.  There, in the 
domain of the small, micrology is supposed to tarry, staying with the details, shapes, 
colours, smells and other prompts to the senses, discerning not some primordial essence, 
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but instead intimations of an ultimately ineffable state, maybe joy or maybe horror, 
suffusing these bodies with these things in this ‘piece of the spatio-temporal world’ (401).  
That, then, is ‘the absolute’ for a micrological sensibility, one that is alert, modest, 
circumspect, careful and care-full, ever ready to delight in the unfathomable but also to 
denounce the abusive.  Tellingly, Adorno also writes that ‘[m]icrology is the place where 
metaphysics finds a haven from totality’ (407), a remark which surely performs double-
duty: situating micrology as at once a counter to both totalising intellectual life (with its 
concepts, systems, teleologies and other grand meaning-making artifices) and to the 
abuses of ‘real’ totalitarian regimes (of conceivably quite different persuasions).  This 
micrology might promise a more immanent, in-the-material engagement than Adorno 
initially conceived in 1949 as critically valid, but it does appear to be where he finally 
landed in his post-Auschwitz poetic commentary, not too long before his death in 1969. 
 
BY WAY OF EXEMPLIFICATION: 
‘HEINE, THE WOUND’ 
 
‘Adorno did not attempt to write poetry’ (Hohendahl 1995, 117), but he wrote numerous 
essays on literary works, notably as collected in his Notes to Literature volumes (eg. 
Adorno 1991a, 1992a).  One such is a piece catching my eye in relation to the theme of 
wounding, a talk given and then originally published in 1956 with the translated title of 
‘Heine the Wound’.  The focus here is Heinrich Heine (1897-1856): a German who lived 
half of his life in France; a Jew who was baptised into Christianity before returning to his 
original faith when dying; and a poet held in high but sometimes disputed regard as part 
of a European Romantic canon of lyric poetry which can be sung or set to music (Atkins, 
1929; Butler, 1956; Feise 1963).  Marking the centenary of Heine’s death, Adorno (1991b, 
80) suggests that to consider Heine is necessarily ‘to speak about a wound … and what 
has been repressed, especially in Germany, since the Second World War’.  The complexity 
of Heine’s identity has been traced across the swirling cultural-political geographies of 
nineteenth-century Europe (Gilman and Hohendahl, 1991), and his Jewishness in German 
lands, even as ‘the baptised Jew’ (Butler 1956, Chap.3), has occasioned reflection on the 
fate of his reputation at the hands of anti-Semitism.  In the charged context of a post-
Auschwitz world, Adorno asks what it means to read Heine’s poetry as part of the still-
open ‘wound’ of violent anti-Semitism, a wound that should not be allowed to heal in any 
comfortable relapse to prior orthodoxies.  In a chapter about the Heine essay, Hohendahl 
(1995, Chap.5) argues that Adorno himself betrays lingering reservations about Heine’s 
challenge to the ‘purity’ or even ‘authenticity’ of German poetic language, perhaps as 
aggravated by Heine enjoying commercial success with lyric poetry: ‘Heine could be 
called a precursor of the culture industry’ (Hohendahl 1995, 107).  Nonetheless, for 
Adorno (1991b, 80), Heine’s alleged ‘guilt’ in these respects, as alleged by German critics 
circa 1900, ‘became an alibi for those of his enemies whose hatred for the Jewish 
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middleman [sic.] ultimately paved the way for the unspeakable horror’.  Heine’s poetry is 
thereby set in a longer-term Holocaust narrative, its history, reception and positioning 
forever cast in the shadow of Auschwitz: ‘Heine’s aura has been painful and guilt-laden, 
as though it were bleeding’ (80). 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Illustration in The North Sea and Other Poems (Heine 1947 [trans.]) 
 
Before tackling Adorno’s reading of Heine, it is worth elaborating on Heine’s life and 
works, not least to note both its geography and the geographical themes present in his 
poetry.  Early biographies of Heine are organised more or less explicitly around the places 
where he stayed (Atkins 1929; Butler 1956), notably the place of his birth, Düsseldorf, 
sometimes called a ‘Franco-German city’ on the Rhine (Atkins 1929, 14) and the place of 
his death, Paris, where serious illness eventually confined him to his home – even to his 
bed or mattress, which he termed his Matratzengruft or ‘mattress-grave’ (Kruse 2002) – 
and hence afforded him such a different experience of this city as that enjoyed by the 
flâneurs and later by Walter Benjamin (who, with Adorno, discovered Heine’s poetry of 
and implicating Paris: Phelan 2002).  In the mid-1820s, he visited the island of Norderney, 
off the North Sea coast of Germany: ‘dwelling in the cottages of the fishermen, and coming 
into the closest and most intimate relations with them’ (Atkins 1929, 66), while ‘[t]he sea 
cast a spell over Heine’ (Butler 1956: 38), he subsequently composed his Nordsee (North 
Sea) cycle of poems with content, shades and word-plays capturing both the life-ways of 
the fisherfolk and the restless landscapes of sea and storm (Figure 2).  Additionally, 
Heine was a travel-writer of sorts, authoring a series of so-called Travel-Sketches or 
Travel-Pictures, commencing in 1826 with the Harz Journey, a ‘walking tour through the 
Harz’ which was the source for a ‘mock guide-book description’ of the Göttingen region, 
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from library to historical hall to silver mines to a mountain idyll (61).  Here was ‘a real 
journey with a real route; a break-away from the prison-house of a town’ (Atkins 1929, 
67), including a night in a miner’s cottage, although realism, fairy-tale, myth and 
philosophical disquisition all fuse together in the process.  This geopoetic excursion 
arguably set the pattern for Heine’s later creative writing, including the Nordsee cycle, 
explicitly positioned as one of the Travel-Sketches, but what also intruded in later pieces 
– based on travels across the lands of Germany, Italy and elsewhere – was a political 
commentary animated by a sustained opposition to suffering.  Tellingly, Butler (1956, 4) 
advises that Heine’s politics, like the fictional poet Jerusalem, was always infused with 
‘compassion, the deepest of all his emotions’. 
It would be neat for the purposes of the present essay to be able to report that 
Heine’s poetry was lovingly micrological, but that would be a stretch.  There are detailed 
‘descriptions of landscapes and peoples’ (Feise 1963, ix) throughout the poems 
comprising the Travel-Sketches – ‘On the mountain stands the cottage/Where the good 
old miner stays/Over it the hemlock rustles/And the moon sheds golden rays’ (from 
Mountain Idyll, in Heine 1963, 57); ‘Beside the pale sea shore/I sat alone with melancholy 
thoughts./The sun dipped deeper down and cast/His burning rays athwart the 
water,/And the white-tipped distant waves,/Urged on by the flood,/Foamed and rippled, 
nearer and nearer – ’ (from Evening Twilight, in Heine1947, 65) – but these details inter-
loop with more casual evocations of affect, sense, belief, doubt and critique.  Heine’s 
brushes with both history and geography are hence pockets of detail set in more gestural 
sweeps, something that one critic describes as a ‘cartoonish’ elicitation of ‘history in 
nutshells’ (Reed 1991), while another remarks on ‘troublesome whimsicalness’ crafting 
‘a romantically coloured showroom of world history in … poems about faraway lands and 
ages past’ (Steinecke 1991, 144).  Fairley (1954, 169), meanwhile, characterises Heine’s 
‘comic-poetic survey of the world’.  Other scholars rework such interpretations, however, 
and offer a sharper account of Heine as a ‘lost cosmopolite’, his own identity wandering 
between Germany, France and elsewhere, who arrives at ‘an openness to the world’ 
which, from the perspective of the un-homed, rises above parochial circumstance to 
adopt a broader, critical vision (Steinecke 1991 esp.158-159).  This point about a critical 
vision is important, weaving into his geography, for Heine located himself as less a poet, 
more ‘an honest soldier in the war for the liberation of [hu]mankind’ (in Butler 1956, 75-
76): the ‘great task of our time’ being ‘emancipation.  Not only that of the Irish, Greeks, 
Frankfort Jews, West Indian blacks, and such oppressed races, but the emancipation of 
the whole world’ (in Atkins 1929, 105).13 
These themes are integrated in an essay by Goetschel (2002), who anatomises 
Heine’s ‘joyous philosophy’, informed by Spinoza, wherein ‘Heine’s anti-idealist 
reinstatement of the flesh, of sensualism and individualism in its irreducible particularity 
exerts a recalcitrant reticence against normative prescriptions of philosophy of a 
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Hegelian – or, for that matter – any other high-flying persuasion’ (Goetschel 2002, 141).  
The appeal to ‘irreducible particularity’ is stirring, easily chiming with claims above about 
micrology as a counter to the mischief of totalising thought, and Heine is portrayed as 
fashioning a ‘poetics … writing at the interstices’ which is a delicate filament in 
‘philosophy’s counter-history’ (141).  Goetschel elaborates in evidence diverse 
substantive features of Heine’s poetry: the attention to assortments of nightingales, mice, 
lizards, worms and other animals, ‘the menageries in Heine’ (Fairley, 1954, 112); or to 
the Egyptian obelisk grandly, symbolically erected in a Paris square which ‘may also lead 
to the release of ‘little poisonous bugs’’ (Goetschel, 2002, 144); or to the ‘flowers [which] 
… express the particular in its irreducible difference’ (147).  Echoing poet Jerusalem’s 
fictional evasion of the cataloguing imperative, the flowers ‘remind us … that beyond the 
rationality of the Linnean system of taxonomy, which dissects and categorises the unique 
phenomenon of the living flower … , there always remains a stubborn rest that resists 
subsumption to the general’ (147).  Moreover, Goetschel stresses ‘the philosophically 
critical impulse at the heart of Heine’s work’ (139), an impulse that endeared Heine to 
nineteenth-century radicals, and which – crucially for this essay – also points him in the 
direction of Adorno and Frankfurt critical theory: 
 
His persistently critical gesture prefigures in its insistence on a critically conceived 
recourse to individuality the decisive turn [that] critical theory will come to take in 
Benjamin, Horkheimer, Marcuse, and Adorno. … Indeed, Heine’s playful exhibition of 
the contradictions of real life brings home the non-identity between concepts and 
what they seek to comprehend, thus prefiguring the critical insights of Adorno’s 
Negative Dialectics. (141 and 142) 
 
Always aware of ‘an ever-different world inaccessible to the powers of reason alone’ 
(144), never straying far from ‘the ugly face of reality’ or ‘life’s base materiality’ (150), it 
seems that Heine’s poetry – even when written simply, allusively, even comically – 
remains in the neighbourhood of Adorno’s child drawn to the smells of ‘the flayer’s zone’. 
These reflections return the essay to Adorno’s own micrological reading of Heine as 
the ‘wound’, the awkward detail or even poisonous bug, confronting fascist tendencies in 
culture, politics and society.  Adorno (1991b, 83) emphasises Heine’s capacity to 
‘manipulate [language] like an instrument’, an-easy virtuosity which does risk a 
superficial deployment of simple, sometimes colloquial language to achieve dramatic 
ends possibly with commercial benefit.  While others like Hohendahl (1995) might 
challenge such a depiction, Adorno himself traces how Heine’s ‘failings’ as a pure poet 
have been precisely what permits his words to be so effectively converted into songs: 
‘songs in which the brittleness of the banal … is used to express what is most real, in the 
form of a wild, unleashed lament’ (83).  Specifically, Adorno examines Heine’s poem The 
Return Home, also known as Lueneberg, after Lüneburg, a town in the German state of 
Lower Saxony where Heine’s parents had moved and which he never enjoyed visiting 
(Atkins 1929, 69).  Below – retaining the poem’s original form – I reproduce an English 
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translation of these stanzas, slightly different from the English version used in the 
translation of Adorno’s piece (in Adorno 1991b, 84-85), the latter from a translation of 
1934 and the one shown below from a translation of 1963 (even if it arguably sounds less 
modern):14 
 
My heart, my heart is dreary 
In the merry radiance of May, 
I lean against the linden 
On the bastion old and grey. 
 
Below flows the blue water 
Quietly in the moat, 
Whistling a tune and fishing 
A young lad rows his boat. 
 
Beyond in gayest colours 
Some tiny objects stand, 
Pavilions and gardens and people, 
Woods, oxen and meadow land. 
 
On the greensward maids bleach linen, 
Frolic and leap around; 
The millwheel scatters diamonds, 
I hear its humming sound. 
 
There is the old grey tower, 
A sentry box below; 
A young red-coated soldier 
Is pacing to and fro. 
 
He’s playing with rifle, 
Which glints in the sunset’s red, 
He shoulders and presents it – 
I wish he would shoot me dead. (Heine 1963 [trans.], 69) 
 
The poem is largely a poetic-geographical description, evoking an historic castle town set 
within a country setting, with scattered details provided of ‘tiny objects’ – buildings, 
green spaces, animals, skipping ‘maids’, the boy in his boat – all implying a busy but 
peaceful local life-world.  Even the penultimate stanza, introducing the tower, sentry box 
and pacing soldier, melds into this tranquil scene; but then there is the shock of the final 
stanza, as the dreary-hearted poet announces his wish to be shot dead by the young 
soldier.  The geopoetic micrology here, if such it be, leaps into the threat of violence, 
unexplained, meaningless and dislocating the cozy picture.  Adorno (1991b, 85) identifies 
Heine’s ‘attempt to draw estrangement itself into the sphere of intimate experience’, and 
– anticipating what Steinecke (1991) claims about Heine the ‘lost cosmopolite’ – also 
positions the poem as an expression of ‘homelessness’, a bitter cry against the wounding 
of all peoples but also a tentative plea for better: 
 
Now that the destiny which Heine sensed has been fulfilled literally [with the 
Holocaust], however, the homelessness has also become everyone’s homelessness; all 
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human beings have been as badly injured in their beings and their languages as Heine 
the outcast was. His words stand in for their words: there is no longer any homeland 
other than a world in which no one would be cast out any more, the world of a 
genuinely emancipated humanity. (Adorno 1991b, 85) 
 
Heine’s own emancipatory ambitions are recalled, in a manner perhaps oddly unbleak for 
Adorno, but the final lessons to learn for the present essay are how Adorno reads this 
geographical poem – arguably itself an exercise in wounded geography, with flashes of 
micrological intent – to revisit his problematic about what poetry can (still) do in the 
horizon of Auschwitz.  Heine the wound, his poetry as wound, this particular poem as 
wound, all ignited with geographical charge: such is what Adorno, joining hands with 
Heine and the fictional Jerusalem, recognises as the ‘poetic territory’ (Peters 2002, 56)15 
of anti-totality, of anti-fascism. 
 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
The spirit and purpose of my essay should now be clear, in that I wish to bring Adorno’s 
critical theory into the geohumanities, perhaps to suggest a critical geohumanities which 
might operate, at least partially, in the negative tenor of ‘never again’: of arranging 
thoughts and actions, to paraphrase Adorno (1973, 365), so that the horrors of fascism 
cannot recur, in Germany or elsewhere.  Specifically, I have considered how one aspect of 
an anti-fascist geography might reside in taking seriously Adorno’s agonising about what 
it might mean to write poetry ‘after Auschwitz’, and in following his halting steps towards 
micrological reconstructions that insist on staying with the suffering – with the details, 
‘every smallest thing’, where the ‘tiny objects stand’ – rather than with either the 
abstraction of cataloguing or the meaning-grabs of transcendence.  Of course, Adorno 
knows that he cannot only remain dwelling in the details, but his further move is always 
to keep the wounds close, to keep their bleeding alive, as a constant check on the excesses 
of the present.  Such was – is – the imperative of his demand for ‘education after 
‘education after the Holocaust’ (Hohendahl 1995, Chap.3),16 which needs to be much 
more than just exercises in poetry, creative writing or poetic-literary criticism, even as 
such aesthetic labour has a role to play.  To underline, such labour undoubtedly lacks the 
gleam of positivity, of responding excitedly to the ‘push’ of the world in the hunt to 
discern new possibilities, energies and geographies; although it can perhaps proceed in 
tandem as a cautious, slower, uncertain and more sceptical cousin for whom banal 
matters are less ‘vibrant’ (Bennett 2010) and more wounded. 
I have so far swerved the literature by geographers that most obviously shares 
ground with my essay,17 chiefly because my emphasis here – on what I might term 
Adorno’s ‘applied micrology’ in the service of writing anti-fascist poetic or critical tracts 
– departs from the interests of Paul Harrison and Richard Carter-White, with their own 
deep questioning of how a witness to the horrors of Auschwitz (or equivalent) can ever 
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give voice and word to the violent phenomenology of what they faced.  Harrison’s (2007b, 
2010, 2011) disquisitions on the limits of a witness’s language – but also on how the 
ultimate non-relatability of their experiences still demands a ‘response’, however 
pathetic, from listeners – can only now, after two decades of non-representational 
geography, be understood for what they signal: namely, the disenchanted, non-magical 
or negative side of what is often lost in the rush of recent human geography (non-
representational, post-phenomenological, practice-based, magical Marxist) to affirm the 
enchantment of worlds (Woodyer and Geoghegan 2013; cf. Harrison 2015; Philo 2017b).  
In this mood, Harrison definitely shakes hands with Adorno, even if his conceptual 
reference-points differ.18 
Carter-White (2009, 2012) provides exacting accounts of Auschwitz testimony – 
how it is performed, as much as how it holds up as empirical evidencing – that cut even 
closer to the grain of my Adorno-inflected orientation (and, indeed, at the outset of his 
2009 paper he acknowledges the Adorno ‘after Auschwitz’ debates).  As with Harrison, 
Carter-White’s intellectual compass deviates from my attraction to Adorno’s critical 
theory, but there are parallels in where we end up standing.  His objection to ‘totalising 
forms of knowledge that render the [extreme] event [such as Auschwitz] transparent, … 
bounding it as a consistent and self-contained phenomena’ (Carter-White 2012: 298) 
recalls Adorno’s disquiet about transcendent poetry and its linkages to 
totality/totalitarianism.  His in-depth readings of Levi’s Auschwitz accounts (eg. Levy 
1987, 1989) are also, arguably, in the vicinity of what Adorno eventually came to view as 
a legitimate modality for post-Auschwitz critical remembrance.19  Indeed, Carter-White 
excavates Levi’s deliberately undramatic attention to detail – a carefully composed ‘space 
of rational, unsullied testimony’ (295) – which stays unsparingly with the spaces of the 
camp, its social relations, the ‘grey zone’ of collaboration between guards and inmates, 
and the micro-logics that led some to be ‘saved’ while others ‘drowned’ (were gassed or 
starved).20  Maybe Levi was also in Borges’s mind when he imagined the poet Jerusalem, 
who delighted in ‘every smallest thing’, and who thereby incited a compassion for the 
world and all of its occupants entirely antithetical to fascism.21  Perhaps oddly, though, 
the claim is that Levi’s writing, rather than furnishing the evidentiary certainty demanded 
in the Holocaust-denier trials (Carter-White 2009), instead generated uncertainty, ‘a 
landscape of paradoxical distinctions and oppositions’ (Carter-White 2012: 295).  He 
authored a refusal, as it were, to allow Auschwitz to be smoothed into simple and 
totalisable formulation, instead demanding that ‘we’ stay with Auschwitz, precisely 
because nothing has been permitted to resolve, to migrate ‘upwards’ to other spheres of 
meaning (such as, from earlier, Wreford Watson’s ‘love of God’).  For Carter-White, this 
uncertainty is also the site of ‘decisionism’ for the individual, the hearer or reader, who is 
compelled to respond personally – and here Harrison’s points about ‘response-ability’ lie 
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in the background – rather than mutedly from behind the blanket of other meanings, 
higher authorities, maybe God. 
To my mind, while differently reasoned, Adorno’s standpoint is broadly akin to 
Levi’s, and thereby, admittedly at some remove in time and space, to that of both Carter-
White and, as mentioned in the introduction, Kearns (2014).  I believe that, with the 
intimations in Negative Dialectics (1973) about what needs to be done in post-Auschwitz 
poetry – the attention to detail, to the dreadful sensory geographies of the camp, to the 
living in and with ‘banal decay’ (as well as alongside the more obviously violent killings) 
– the parallels become still closer.  My essay has pursued Adorno’s arguments about the 
need for poetry, criticism and indeed philosophy that strives not for higher-level ‘purity’, 
but precisely to be ‘soiled’ and ‘spoiled’, never comforting, always disconcerting, never 
idealistically transcendent, always materialistically micrological.  The particular 
articulations of poetry and geography at stake here are all about being wounded, bearing 
wounds, feeling wounds, remembering wounds, voicing wounds, writing wounds.  These 
wounds are also the wounds of spaces, places, landscapes and environments; they are 
wounded poetic geographies that can readily be sited in the horizon of Adorno’s 
circumspect wishes for a critical and effective poetry ‘after Auschwitz’.  These are poems 
and geographies that must indeed hesitate before ‘squeezing any kind of sense, however 
bleached, out of the victims’ fate’ (Adorno, 1973, p.361); these are, in sum, poems and 
geographies of the senseless. 
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NOTES 
 
1 Borges’s short story creates two fictional characters, Linde and Jerusalem, although with undoubted 
‘real’ historical parallels. Soegel (Sörgel) was a German literary historian who acquired Nazi 
sympathies; Whitman an American poet, essayist and journalist, someone regarded as significant in 
the ‘big picture’ scripting of American life and destiny, and who ‘found beauty, even reassurance in 
death’ (Poetry Foundation 2016, n.p.). Whitman is occasionally positioned as a ‘geographer’, 
fascinated by nature and maps (Roche 1998; also Gerhardt 2004). Somewhat against the grain of my 
reasoning in this essay, Whitman has been paralleled with Heine, another poet, discussed below 
(Gilman and Hohendahl 1991, 11). 
2. This phrase, ‘every smallest thing’, is derived from a different translation (Borges 1999, 232) of this 
short story, replacing ‘each thing’ from the first paragraph in the epigraph. 
3 I deliberately signal ‘the camp’, in order to intimate that arguments from Agamben (1998, 1999, 2005) 
about homo sacer and ‘states/spaces of exception’ are part of this essay’s undergirding. On the 
relations between Adorno and Agamben, see Bernstein (2004), Morgan (2009) and Vatter (2014, 
Chap.3). 
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4 Linde drove Jerusalem to a mental breakdown and then he died. Borges as the ‘editor’ of Linde’s final 
memoir edits some text, where Linde would have detailed his mistreatment of Jerusalem, because it 
would be too harrowing for the reader. 
5 I use the phrases ‘geopoetics’ and ‘geopoetry’ – admittedly, quite loosely – to signal a concern for how 
themes or sensibilities of geography, space, place, landscape and environment may filter through, 
perhaps deeply structuring, works of poetry and prose (creative writing in the round). In so doing, I 
arguably extend the more earthed, localised, ‘nature’-facing, even ‘geological’ connotations usually 
associated with these terms: eg. Magrane 2015; Scottish Centre for Geopoetics 2016; Written in the 
Rocks 2012. 
6 His published presidential address on ‘The soul of geography’ (Wreford Watson 1983), a plea for 
deploying literary sources, notably poetry, in the composing of academic geography, is a clear early 
statement about geohumanities. Saunders (2010, esp.446) provides an insightful reworking of 
debates about ‘literary geographies’, paying particular attention to ‘the spatial poetics of literature’ 
(what I am terming ‘geopoetics’), while Magrane (2015) sets and agenda for geography-poetry 
exchanges. See also the new journal Literary Geographies (website given in References); and also, from 
a literary-critical angle, Alexander and Cooper (2013) and Entwhistle (2013). 
7 ‘Professional’ academic geographers writing poetry now includes notable contributions from 
Cresswell (2013a, 2013b) and de Leeuw (2013, 2015). Magrane (2016) coins the phrase ‘geographer-
poets’, considers Cresswell and de Leeuw, and offers some of his own geopoetry. 
8 I am indebted to Avril Maddrell for suggesting this caution about my critical reading of Wreford 
Watson’s poetry: arguably, indeed, there are ‘Christian geographers’ who might account differently 
for his poetics of wounds, blood and God’s love. 
9  Hints at such a perspective can also be gleaned from Wreford Watson’s geographical texts. For 
instance, right at the outset of his 1982 regional geography monograph, The United States: Habitation 
of Hope, it is avowed that ‘clashes of race and culture … have divided, hurt, and yet enriched the nation’ 
(Wreford Watson 1982, ix: my emphases). Perhaps Wreford Watson inherits a Whitmanesque way of 
telling the grand-historical geography of the US, a claim circling back to the contrast noted earlier 
between Whitman and the fictional Jerusalem. 
10 There is a mountain of secondary literature on Adorno, but I have particularly consulted Brunkhorst 
(1999), Buck-Morss (1977), Hohendahl (1995), Jameson (1990), Jay (1984), Rose (1978) and 
Schweppenhäuser (2009). Excellent biographies of Adorno are Jäger (2004) and Müller-Doohm 
(2005). Academic geography’s engagement with Adorno has, as yet, been quite minimal; but I draw 
inspiration from elements in Dubow (2008) and Saldanha (2013). 
11 One among a handful of curious but telling deployments of the figure of ‘the child’ throughout Adorno’s 
oeuvre, and notably in Negative Dialectics: see Philo (2017a). 
12 A fuller investigation of Adorno’s micrology would require sustained engagement with what 
Benjamin, described by McCole (1993, ix) as a ‘micrological investigator of culture’. Mali (2003, 228-
229) explicitly names ‘Benjamin’s ‘micrology’’ when characterising the latter’s ‘predilections for the 
tiniest and most concrete aspects of grand theories and institutions’: an approach, borrowing words 
from Adorno about Benjamin, enacted as ‘a kind of concretion … whereby scant and seemingly 
insignificant objects – be they material (toys, stamps, postcards) or literal (proverbs, legends, 
quotations) – yield ... secret meanings’. Adorno (1967c, 240) remarks on Benjamin’s ‘preference … for 
small or shabby objects like dust or plush’. Adorno’s own micrological practice is probably most 
obviously expressed in the deliberately fragmented and fractured morsels of ‘individuality’ or 
particularity dispersed throughout his text Minima Moralia (Adorno 2005). 
13 Heine continued on the theme of ‘emancipation’: ‘especially of Europe, that has come of age, and is 
now wresting itself free from the leading-strings of the privileged classes, the aristocracy’ (in Atkins 
1929, 105). Such views did not endear him to Europe’s landed classes, but did to those with radical 
sympathies, including Marx (eg. Cook 2002, 11-16; Gilman and Hohendahl 1991, 2-3). 
14 My choice of translation is influenced by the fact that the one shown here includes the reference to 
‘tiny objects’, fitting neatly with my broader micrological reasoning, whereas the version given in 
Adorno (1991b) simply talks of items in the scene as ‘little and bright’. 
15 Peters (2002) is primarily concerned with Heine’s eroticism, his sexual concerns for ‘the flesh’. 
16 Adorno himself penned an essay called ‘Education after Auschwitz’, published after his death, which 
opens as follows: ‘The premier demand upon all education is that Auschwitz should not happen again. 
Its priority before any other requirement is such that I believe I need not and should not justify it. … 
Every debate about the ideals of education is trivial and inconsequential compared to this single ideal: 
never again Auschwitz’ (Adorno 1971, 1). I take this injunction as ground for crafting different species 
of anti-fascist geography. 
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17 Additionally, there could be more reaching across to the growing body of work on the geographies of 
the Holocaust, the concentration/death camps, the Jewish ghettos, Nazi spatial planning, Holocaust 
memorialisation, and much more: a superb new resource in this connection is Giaccaria and Minca 
(2016). 
18 They both offer sustained but critical, intrigued but hesitant, engagements with Heidegger: with 
dwelling, Being, the Black Forest cottage, authenticity and more (Adorno, 2003; Harrison 2007). 
Harrison (2015, 2 and Note 2 on p.16) explicitly borrows from Minima Moralia (Adorno 2005). 
19 In a Paris Review interview of 1994 (in Oard 2015, n.p.), Steiner was asked to assess Adorno’s ‘No 
poetry after Auschwitz’ dictum. In among various points – including an Adornoian caution against the 
dangers of ‘reduc[ing] them [the horrors] to articulate language, which in a curious way [is] to make 
them acceptable’ – Steiner responds that ‘only three or four writers’ had managed to evade such snares 
in order to ‘communicate something of the essential experience’. When pressed for names, he replies, 
‘[Paul] Celan above all. Without any doubt, Primo Levi, the Italian-Jewish writer: supreme, supreme, 
supreme. There isn’t a word out of place; it’s a miracle. … But at what cost? Celan commits suicide. 
Pimo Levi commits suicide.’ 
20 It has been called a ‘figural realism’ (in Carter-White 2012, 295). 
21 Heine, as explored above, might also be enlisted as a compassionate co-traveller in this regard. 
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